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The “Unguarding” (Vehrwahrlosung) of Human Life in Biotechnology: 




Philosopher Martin Heidegger’s writing on the essence of technology has often been seen as too 
abstract even though he illustrated his concerns with reference to technological developments of his 
day.  While most in the immediate post-World War 2 period judged thermonuclear weaponry to be 
the most obvious technological threat to the future of humanity, Heidegger instead considered 
developments in the biological sciences to be more so.  In the discussion presented here, Heidegger’s 
thinking is related to developments in biotechnology, specifically assisted reproductive technology.  
The task here is (1) to illustrate how Heidegger’s disquiet is manifested in such technologies and (2) 
to emphasize the significance of his call for a “step back” from the calculative thinking dominant in 
the natural sciences to what he called, alternately, “essential,” “meditative,” or “commemorative” 
thinking.  Only through this latter mode of thinking can we expect to enter into a “free” relationship to 
technology. 
 




When and how do things come as things?  They do not come through the machinations of humans.  But they 
also do not come without the vigilance of mortals.  The first step to such vigilance is the step back from merely 
representational, i.e., explanatory thinking [erklärenden Denken], into commemorative thinking [das 
andenkende Denken]. 
      --Heidegger, “The Thing,”1 
 
Thinking…is the hidden and innermost dispute of our history. 
--Heidegger, “Basic Principles of Thinking”2 
 
We, women […] declare that the female body, with its unique capacity for creating human life, is being 
exploited and dissected as raw material for the technological production of human beings…Genetic and 
reproductive engineering is another attempt to end self determination over our own bodies. 







1 Martin Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic 
Principles of Thinking, trans. A.J. Mitchell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 
19. German text added as given in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe III. Abteilung: 
Unveröffentliche Abhandlungen Vorträge—Gedachtes, Band 79, Bremer und Freiburger 
Vorträge (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 1994), “Das Ding,” 20.  The 
German volume is referenced hereafter as “GA79.” 
2 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “Basic Principles of Thinking,” 93. 
3  Nadia Mahjouri, “Techno-Maternity: Rethinking the Possibilities of Reproductive 
Technologies,” Third Space: a Journal of Feminist Theory & Culture, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2003): 
https://journals.sfu.ca/thirdspace/index.php/journal/article/viewArticle/mahjouri/157, 
accessed 06 January 2021, citing R. Klein, “Genetic and Reproductive Engineering—The 
Global View,” in Jocelyn A. Scutt, ed., The Baby Machine: The Commercialization of 
Motherhood (Carlton: McCulloch Publishing Ltd., 1988), 258. 
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Heidegger’s Call for a Different Thinking 
As far as twentieth century philosopher Martin Heidegger is concerned, since the seventeenth 
century onward, modern technology “has arranged its expansion and rule over the whole 
earth,” the implication of which is that “all the inhabitants of the earth” are claimed “in a 
uniform manner” thereby to be present for human interests as “calculable material.”4  
Calculability implies that even philosophy “turns into the empirical science of man, of all of 
what can become the experiential object of his technology for man, the technology by which 
he establishes himself in the world by working on it in the manifold modes of making and 
shaping.  All of this happens everywhere on the basis and according to the criterion of the 
scientific discovery of the individual areas of beings.”5 
In the modern transformation of philosophy with the rise of the positive sciences as 
empirical sciences,6 thinking undergoes a basic change such that scientific method brings 
with it the objectification of the whole of reality and the insistence on engaging all beings as 
calculable material, not only in the sense of quantitative measurement but in the sense that 
methods of measurement become determinative of the way things are understood to have 
their being.  We should find this development problematic: “The need to ask about modern 
technology is presumably dying out to the same extent that technology more definitely 
characterizes and regulates the appearance of the totality of the world and the position of man 
in it.”7  The need to interrogate modern technology remains with us in view of a possibility of 
a preparatory thinking: “We are thinking of the possibility that the world civilization which is 
just now beginning might one day overcome the technological-scientific-industrial character 
																																																								
4 Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 
1972), 7. 
5 Heidegger, On Time and Being, 57. 
6  For a lengthy discussion of Heidegger’s views on modern science, see Joseph J. 
Kockelmans, Heidegger and Science (Washington DC: Center for Advanced Research in 
Phenomenology & University Press of America, 1985), especially Part II: Heidegger’s 
Conception of the Sciences, Chapter IV: Toward the Essence of Empirical Science, 117 ff. 
7 Heidegger, On Time and Being, 58. 
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as the sole criterion of man’s world sojourn.”8  “But,” one may ask, “why should one propose 
such a possibility?”  Heidegger would answer to those who have no such apprehension: 
When modern science, e.g., that of biochemistry, can “synthesize, split and change living 
substance at will,” we fail to discern what is at issue for humanity; “For precisely if the 
hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in 
the world moves upon us.”9  
In his essay, “The Danger” (“Die Gefahr”), Heidegger remarks that we often observe 
(and, therefore, evaluate) technology only “technologically.”  That is, we tend to judge this 
and that technique, technical device, or large-scale technology, etc., usually (a) scientifically 
and positively as an “advance” for the benefit of humanity or, (b) negatively as a “threat” or 
“danger” to human welfare, depending on the context of political culture and the normative 
ethics involved in the evaluation of the particular technology (e.g., new technologies of 
assisted human reproduction10). Heidegger is not satisfied with such evaluative judgments, 
however, insofar as they “never arrive at the essence of technology [das Wesen der 
Technik]…Thus it changes nothing if one abhors technology as disaster or prizes it as the 
greatest advance of humankind and extols it as the redeemer of humanity.”11  For Heidegger, 
interrogation of technology in the contemporary world is insufficient if it is satisfied merely 
																																																								
8 Heidegger, On Time and Being, 60. 
9 Martin Heidegger, “Memorial Address,” Discourse on Thinking, trans. J. Anderson and 
E.H. Freund (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 52. 
10 See here, e.g., Paul R. Brezina and Yulian Zhao, “The Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues 
Impacted by Modern Assisted Reproductive Technologies,” Obstetrics and Gynecology 
International, (2012): https://doi.org/10.1155/2012/686252, accessed 30 December 2020.  
The authors argue that, assisted reproductive technology “has resulted in a tectonic shift in 
the way physicians and the general population perceive infertility and ethics.”  Indeed, the 
authors concluded, “the lion’s share of ethical and legal questions that exist surrounding ART 
have yet to be resolved.”  More recently, see Justo Aznar and Julio Tudela, “Bioethics of 
Assisted Reproductive Technology,” in Nidhi Sharma, Sudakshina Chaktrabarti, Yona Barak, 
and Adrian Ellenbogen, eds., Innovations in Assisted Reproductive Technology (London: 
Intechopen, 2020). 
11 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 55-56. 
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with studying the ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI) and does not engage what is at 
issue more fundamentally, viz., the essence of technology.  
 Relative to Heidegger’s concern for technological developments in the life sciences, 
Nathan Van Camp argued some years ago that, “Heidegger took the radical challenge of 
biotechnology both too seriously and not seriously enough.  Too seriously, because it is 
unclear why he would fear the annihilation of Dasein’s essence if he is convinced that this 
essence is not related to man’s biological equipment in the first place.  Not seriously enough, 
because Heidegger at the same time remained convinced that even the most intrusive 
interventions in the human body will not be able to disrupt Dasein’s ontological essence.”12  
Van Camp recognized Heidegger’s unease about the transformation of biology “into 
biophysics” (thus bio-engineering), which portends the “production” of the human being as a 
material-bodily thing “according to a definite plan just like any other technical object.”  
Following Jürgen Habermas, Van Camp is correct to consider that biotechnology entails 
consequences for our “ethical self-understanding” and our “moral consciousness,” and to ask 
“where the threshold lies between the appropriate and inappropriate use of biotechnology” 
(though one may differ with him that this is “the main question”).  Notwithstanding, Van 
Camp did not engage Heidegger’s main question per se, viz., exposing the relation of the 
human essence to the essence of technology and understanding the idea of human essence 
other than as merely a “natural” essence.13  This must be done in a way that captures what 
																																																								
12 Nathan Van Camp, “Heidegger and the Question Concerning Biotechnology,” Journal of 
Philosophy of Life, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2012): 32-54.  ‘Dasein’ is the term Heidegger uses in his 
magnum opus Being and Time to designate the human way to be, distinct from “things 
present-at-hand” (e.g., fauna, flora) and “things ready-to-hand” (tools and equipment in 
general). 
13 Van Camp (p. 41) is correct that Heidegger “consistently rejected biological determinations 
of the human essence” as well as the metaphysical view of the human as animal rationale—
rational animal in the sense of “a natural entity to which some higher capacity such as speech, 
reason or a soul is added.”  Heidegger’s attention to the human manner of being that is “ek-
sistent”, i.e., temporal and futural by “standing out” in projection of its own most proper 
potentiality-for-being, removes the human being conceptually from scientific 
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Heidegger finds fundamentally problematic in developments in biological science and 
biotechnology.  It is argued here that developments in human assisted reproductive 
technologies especially illustrate what Heidegger is keen to clarify.14   
There is a “violence” to technology, Heidegger would have us understand, but that 
violence is first of all to be discerned in its essence, thus Heidegger’s term Wesensgewalt.  To 
speak of an essence to technology may very likely be strange for those who have adopted a 
scientific approach to technology.  But, Heidegger turns the question away from the scientific 
to what is more fundamental in questioning this phenomenon of the modern world.  Thus he 
says: “The essential violence of technology does not first of all lie in the effect of high-
frequency machines, but rather in that technology, proximally and for the most part, only 
presents itself to human representation technologically.”15  What is required, according to 
Heidegger’s assessment, is to risk “the step of thinking that exposes our human essence 
																																																																																																																																																																												
“objectification” as some thing merely “present-at-hand” (vorhanden), thus by no means a 
thing to be understood by being limited to the human body (Körper). 
14 Heidegger’s anticipatory concern is borne out in recent discussions of the prospect of 
artificial human gametogenesis.  See, e.g., Pu-Yao Zhang, Yong Fan, Tao Tan, and Yang Yu, 
“Generation of Artificial Gamete and Embryo From Stem Cells in Reproductive Medicine,” 
Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology (2020): 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2020.00781, accessed 31 December 2020.  The authors 
comment: “In addition to the great growing need for assisted reproduction technologies 
(ART), additional solutions for patient without functional gametes are strongly 
needed…[Artificial] gametes and embryos represent a new hope for clinical application and 
basic research in the field of reproductive medicine…This area of research remains 
noteworthy and requires further study and effort to achieve the reconstitution of the entire 
cycle of gametogenesis and embryo development in vitro.”  It is in view of such a research 
agenda that I disagree with Van Camp’s assessment (p. 46) that: “The danger of 
biotechnology [for Heidegger] does not primarily consist in concrete empirical threats posed 
by technical interventions on the genome, but in the threat that we will understand ourselves 
as bio-genetic entities that can be manipulated at will.”  I also disagree with his assertion (p. 
52) that, “Even if man would be completely genetically modified, this would not really affect 
the core of his being because his essence is not grounded in his biological constitution, but in 
his ek-static belonging to Being.”  It is precisely this ek-static trait of the human way to be 
that is undermined when humans are considered equivalent to things present-at-hand and 
readily manipulated.  The problem is all the more pressing in recent developments in human 
germline editing.  For the latter see, e.g., The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, 
and Medicine, Heritable Human Genome Editing (2020), (Washington D.C.: National 
Academies Press, 2020), http://nap.edu/25665, accessed 06 January 2021. 
15 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 56. 
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[Menschenwesen] to the essence of technology, not only to its manipulations and uses.”16  
Here, too, the scientific-minded are likely not inclined to recognize the idea of a human 
essence and will dismiss it all too readily as an idea of a bygone era of speculative 
metaphysics and a distraction from the goals of scientific “progress.” 
Of course, it is unclear what one may mean here (i) in thinking to “expose” (darlegen) 
the human essence to the essence of technology, (ii) in what sense one speaks of a human 
essence, (iii) in what sense one can speak of an essence of technology, and (iv) whether the 
concept of essence (Wesen) is univocal, equivocal, or plurivocal in such assertions.  
Assuming these queries are to be clarified to some degree in due course of the following 
discussion, the guiding assumption here is that, were we to expose the human essence and to 
think the essence of technology in their essential connection, then we would be called to a 
different thinking.  But, more to the point, in that way we would be called forth to a new 
conception of the world (die Welt) in which we have our being and, thereby, to a new self-
understanding of humanity insofar as our manner of being is conceived always with reference 
to some concept of world. 
 Immediately one is disposed to ask about this different thinking, what Heidegger 
means in conceiving its significance, its possibility, and perhaps even its efficacy if it makes 
sense to use this latter word in reference to Heidegger’s conceptual lexicon. One must begin 
here by clarifying that, for Heidegger, to think technologically is to engage in what he calls 
calculative thinking (rechnendes Denken), i.e., an “explanatory thinking” (erklärenden 
Denken) that reasons primarily in terms of causality, means-ends relations, and “causal 
effects” (ursächliche Wirken), with ‘causality’ conceptually reduced from the broader 
Aristotelian sense17 to that of “efficient cause” only. Calculative thinking such as one finds in 
																																																								
16 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 56. 
17 For an overview, see Richard DeWitt, Worldviews: An Introduction to the History and 
Philosophy of Science, 2nd Edition (West Sussex UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 7-13.  Also, 
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modern science seeks both efficacy and efficiency in investigating and eventually 
manipulating what is experienced as “the realm of the actual,” i.e., the “real” (die Wirkliche).  
The “real” is what science exposes by way of its investigative methods, “challenging” nature 
to reveal itself in ways hitherto unknown.  It is in this way that modern technology is a 
challenging (Herausfordern) power of revealing (das Entbergen). 
In contrast, if one is to think the essence of technology, one must take a “step back” 
from the scientific method of explanation and dominant concern for efficacy and efficiency 
into what Heidegger calls (on different occasions) “essential” thinking (wesentliche Denken), 
“meditative” thinking (besinnliches Denken) or “commemorative” thinking (andenkende 
Denken).  In this way one may reflect upon how the human being “stands” or—more 
accurately, from Heidegger’s point of view—is “fallen”/“befallen” in his and her essence 
(Wesen) vis-à-vis the essence of technology.  It is only through essential, meditative, and 
commemorative thinking that one may “expose” the human essence in its essential 
connection (die wesentliche Verbindung) to the essence of technology.  It is in thinking 
through this essential connection that one may approach a phenomenological clarification of 
the essence of technology. 
To do this one ought not think technology technologically, thus not merely as 
“instrumental,” i.e., as “a means, to any end”18 or merely “anthropologically” (as what is 
pertinent to human interests), even though we find technologies to be understood and 
evaluated as useful in relation to diverse human interests and goals.  Rather, the task is to 
think what is disguised in all technologies in use (specifically since the onset of modernity, 
and considering developments of science especially in the twentieth century), even as the 
essence of technology for the most part remains concealed (verborgen) when we think 
																																																																																																																																																																												
more specifically, see Melbourne G. Evans, “Causality and Explanation in the Logic of 
Aristotle,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1959): 466-485, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2105115.pdf, accessed 05 January 2021. 
18 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 57. 
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calculatively.  That is, technology in its essence “is the concealed basic trait of the actuality 
of everything now actual.”19  To say ‘actuality’ here is to say ‘reality,’ thus to mean the way 
things, beings, are represented to us.  Thus, all beings, including the human being, in their 
actuality are governed technologically, such that the technological as the basic trait of all 
beings is concealed. That this basic trait is concealed should give us pause as a matter that 
calls for our thinking, but clearly not the thinking that one finds in the sciences as such. 
Lest we begin wrongly by thinking Heidegger faults human understanding with an 
intentional act of omission, we are to bear in mind that Heidegger claims technology 
“conducts its own disguising” (betreibt seine eigene Verstellung). We, for the most part, do 
not notice this while we are immersed in, and otherwise dominated by, the instrumental-
anthropological view of technology and by calculative thinking.  What is disguised in all 
technologies and techniques in use, Heidegger opines, is that, rather than being merely 
instrumental and in one way or another apparently subject to human control, technology 
draws the human after it as its instrument (als ihr Instrument hinter sich her ziehe).20  It is in 
this “drawing after” that technology is disguised.  And, since the human is drawn after it, 
there is manifest reason to assert that, in fact, technology is not subject to human control in 
the way in which scientific thinking generally presents itself in examining, interrogating, and 
explaining reality. 
Heidegger’s statement is especially critical to the shift in thinking he is proposing.  
Technology draws the human after it even as a “dark compulsion” [dunklen Andrangs], 
Heidegger asserts, “that has befallen the human essence [Menschenwesen] from the essence 
of technology itself.”21  Note the word ‘befallen.’  This compulsion is no mere human doing 
such that one might fault those who are productive of the many technologies and research 
																																																								
19 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 58. 
20 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 58. 
21 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 58. 
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techniques that transform daily life and then think to correct either their negligence or their 
oversight. Rather, that compulsion is dark because it is concealed in the very “progress” said 
to characterize technology conceived in its instrumentality and evaluated in its calculated 
utility or otherwise decried in its disutility, the latter motivating yet further opportunities for 
enhanced utility as obstacles in research productivity are overcome.  Yet, it is the task of a 
meditative thinking to interrogate and clarify how this compulsion befalls humanity in its 
pursuit of assorted technologies and techniques in the research-driven enterprise.  Heidegger, 
therefore, appropriates to himself the task of thinking the essence of technology, and without 
the usual evaluative prejudices in doctrine that pronounce technology to be evil, good, or 
neutral. 
The Essence of Technology 
Setting these normative prejudices aside, Heidegger then states what he takes to be essential 
to technology, beginning with the assertion that, “The essence of technology is itself nothing 
technological” (“Das Wesen der Technik ist selber nichts Techniches.”). 22  In distinguishing 
“technology” (der Technik) from that which is “technological” (technisches), Heidegger 
thinks more fundamentally and away from the instrumental view.  Indeed, in doing so he is 
prepared to contend that the essence of technology is to be understood as “the being of 
contemporary beings” (“als das Sein des jetzt Seienden”),23 i.e., the way in which all beings 
today appear, are represented, explained, appropriated, and used or used up, according to 
scientifically generated measures of utility, efficacy, and efficiency.  This is so even for the 
human being when its manner of being is reduced to that of the body (Körper).24  Heidegger 
then names the essence of technology ‘positionality’ (Ge-Stell).  It is only by way of our 
																																																								
22 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 56; GA79, 60. 
23 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 59; GA79, 62. 
24 See, e.g., Jesse I. Bailey, “Enframing the Flesh: Heidegger, Transhumanism, and the Body 
as ‘Standing Reserve,” Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2014): 44-62, 
https://jetpress.org/v24/bailey.pdf, accessed 31 December 2020. 
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understanding and thinking positionality as the essence of technology that we can have an 
insight into the plight of our time and be sufficiently thoughtful for the essential decisions 
that face us. 
Heidegger steps back from modernity and its conceptual framework to Greek 
antiquity to think of the term ‘position’ (‘stellen’; in the Greek: ‘thésis’) in relation to the 
Greek concept ‘physis’, interpreted to mean ‘bringing-here-forth’, i.e., “letting something 
arrive and presence of its own accord” (“von sich her etwas ankommen und anwesen 
lassen”).25  In this arriving into presence something comes into being from concealment 
(Verborgenheit) into unconcealment (Unverborgenheit).  Important here is the recognition 
that something comes to presence, i.e., is unconcealed, of its own accord.  Such is the basic 
trait of physis.  In this sense, physis is distinguished from the act of human positioning of 
something in the sense of “production” (Herstellen), e.g., the stone that is present of its own 
accord in rock and soil but which is subsequently taken by the artisan and “positioned” in the 
production of a staircase.  Heidegger is clear: “What stands here through θέσις essences 
otherwise than what is brought forth here by φύσις” (“Das θέσει Herständige west anders an 
als das φύσει Hervorgebrachte”).26  What is unconcealed by physis is not present—does not 
have its actuality—through an intervening act of human production.  Its essence is thus 
different from the essence of what is present through being-positioned through that human 
intervention that is concerned with production of something in view of human ends, goals, 
and purposes. 
 The distinction of what occurs through physis and what occurs through thésis may be 
further distinguished as that which occurs through self-emergent nature and that which 
occurs through human production, through techné, the latter emerging as the product of an 
assortment of techniques and technologies instrumentally of use to human livelihood.  Both 
																																																								
25 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 60; GA79, 64. 
26 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 61; GA79, 64. 
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the essence of technology (as positionality) and the essence of the human (as one positioned 
along with all other beings) are essentially connected in this way. Calculative thinking, such 
as one encounters in the methodological commitments of the sciences, objectifies things 
according to the methods of scientific explanation and instrumentally pursues techniques and 
technologies in view of some standard of efficacy and efficiency.  Such thinking assumes that 
technology is subject to human control.  But, such calculative thinking ignores what is 
essential here as disclosed by the step back from this thinking. 
Heidegger reminds: “We place history [die Geschichte] in the realm of what occurs 
[in den Bereich des Geschehens], instead of thinking history in accordance with its essential 
provenance [Wesensherkunft] in terms of destiny [Geschick].”27  History (Geschichte) has its 
provenance in what is essential and that is not captured by historical science in the sense of 
what are the events of this or that historical event, what is explained “historiographically” as 
“history” (Historie).  History in the latter sense methodologically involves application of 
methods that concern causal relations.  But, to speak of history in Heidegger’s sense of 
Geschichte is to think in terms of the essential that is present as a fundamental trait and 
present as a destining (ein Schicksal).  Thus, we may survey the developments in technology 
since the onset of modernity and think such developments merely as “what occurs” and what 
occurs as a consequence of human innovation of techniques and technologies, thus all a 
manifestation of human production and a manifestation of techné. 
But, insofar as one discerns the essence of technology, as Heidegger proposes, there is 
more than history here—there is a destiny, and a concealed destiny that must yet be thought, 
hence Heidegger’s counsel to step back from calculative thinking and to think the essence of 
technology through essential/meditative/commemorative thinking.  It is clear that technology 
in Heidegger’s sense of positionality is itself disclosive of the way in which all beings are 
																																																								
27 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “The Turn,” 65; GA79, “Die Kehre,” 69. 
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now for the most part “unconcealed” (unverborgen), such that what emerges “naturally” (as 
physis) is itself imposed upon through techné—keeping in mind that, insofar as humans 
impose upon reality through their engagement with techné they themselves are drawn after 
and imposed upon by the technological without being “in control” as such.   The whole of 
what is “actual” in the sense of “the real” is caught up into a destining manifest in technology 
qua positioning.  How this occurs today we may describe by thinking developments in 
biotechnology. Heidegger had provided examples based on the technologies emergent in his 
day, but biotechnology in our day illustrates Heidegger’s concern uniquely. 
Positionality in Biotechnology 
In the aftermath of the unprecedented atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and as the 
arms race installed stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction that assured humanity of the 
unthinkable of “mutually assured destruction,” all of this was characterized as a possible 
future “horror” that confronted us with “dread.”  Yet, lecturing in 1949 not long after the 
singular historical events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Heidegger spoke of “the horrible” (das 
Entsetzliche) that had already occurred (wenn das Entsetzliche schon geschehen is).28  In 
what way?  Heidegger explained: “The horrifying is what transposes all that is out of its 
previous essence.  What is so horrifying?  It reveals and conceals itself in the way that 
everything presences…. (Das Entsetzende ist Jenes, das alles, was ist, aus seinem vormaligen 
Wesen heraussetzt.  Was ist dieses Entsetzende?  Es zeigt und verbingt sich in der Weise, wie 
alles anwest….).29  
 Thus, one asks, with Heidegger: How do things have their “presence” (Anwesenheit), 
their “actuality,” today?  They have their presence no longer in terms of their “singular 
existence” naturally emergent in the sense of physis, but instead in their “replaceability” that 
																																																								
28 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “The Point of Reference,” 4; GA79, “Einblick 
in das was ist,” 9. 
29 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 4; GA79, 9. 
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is dictated by techné.  The former connotes what is singular to an entity in its manner of 
being such that humans “let it be” within its environing world (Umwelt) without objectifying 
it and positioning it as “stock,” as “standing-reserve” (Bestand), as a “piece of inventory” 
(Bestandstücke) according to a human interest, in its being ordered and arranged accordingly 
for use, and being used up in view of its planned and produced replaceability.  One can take 
here as example a single human cell, viz., the ovum, that is of interest to the embryologist as 
bioengineer.30 
Initially, the human ovum “stands on its own” as a cell in a natural process of human 
reproduction prior to it being perceived and subsequently re-presented as an object of 
scientific investigation.  Heidegger uses the expression Insichstehen (“standing on its own”).  
The ovum “is,” exists naturally, thus according to a natural biological process, consistent 
with the concept of physis.  The human ovum is generated monthly naturally, functions 
naturally, within a woman’s monthly cycle of possible fertilization through natural 
reproduction (coital conception).  However, when the ovum is “positioned” in the artificial 
process of assisted reproductive technology (ART) as part of the science of reproductive 
endocrinology, it no longer stands on its own but is manipulated for use, and even for being 
used up within an artificially manipulated ovulation cycle, i.e., by way of ovulation 
																																																								
30  One says here ‘bioengineer’ decidedly, stressing the intentional integration of the 
technology and engineering practice with the science qua theory.  This conceptual frame can 
be understood as conceived recently, e.g., in Harvard University’s initial planning, introduced 
by a working committee in 2007, for “Engineering Biology for the 21st Century: A Plan for 
Bioengineering at Harvard,” 
https://hms.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/assets/About_Us/Off_Dean/files/Bioengineer.pdf, 
accessed 30 December 2020.  The document states, inter alia (p. 3): “Life sciences have 
reached a turning point.  A large number of basic mechanisms have been discovered, and the 
essential mystery of life has been stripped away by the last 50 years of molecular biology.  
But this tremendous progress has now led us to an understanding of just how complex 
biology really is.  Biology now needs large infusions of conceptual and quantitative 
approaches from information science and the physical sciences.  Biology needs to be 
converted into a rigorous, predictive science through computation, theory, and model 
building, and into a field that is truly useful to society, through engineering…Biology is now 
ready for deep engagement with engineering.”  Harvard subsequently developed a curriculum 
in bioengineering, including “cell and tissue engineering.” 
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induction—“stimulating the development and release of oocytes in anovulatory patients.”31  
Here physis yields to techné, to the technologies of ART, the ovum positioned as an extra-
corporeally manipulated oocyte in relation to yet further techniques of “assisted fertilization, 
most commonly in vitro fertilization (IVF) and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI),” 
including additional techniques of “ovarian hyperstimulation,” “pre-implantation genetic 
testing” for “pre-implantation genetic diagnosis” as well as “pre-implantation genetic 
screening,” and then implantation in utero with the goal of a live birth pregnancy. 
In and of itself the purpose of ART and IVF satisfies beneficence concerns.  
According to recent reports, “Infertility, defined as the inability to conceive within 1 year of 
unprotected intercourse, is estimated to affect as many as 186 million people worldwide.”32  
Further, “In 2003, the European Society for Human Reproduction and Embryology 
recommended that the outcome measure of assisted reproductive techniques (ART) and non-
ART should be ‘singleton’ live birth…Traditionally, success rates of in-vitro fertilization 
(IVF) have been reported in terms of live births per fresh cycle or embryo transfer.”  Others 
call for revision to this measure in view of multiple cycles—“Studies assessing effectiveness 
in MAR [medically assisted reproduction] should therefore aim to study the effectiveness of 
treatment over multiple cycles, as this reflects clinical practice and captures the relevant 
perspective for the couple.”33 
Whatever the professional recommendations on revising the measurement of ART 
outcomes, the fact is that, “Over 8 million IVF children have been born, and over 2.5 million 
																																																								
31  See here, Kathryn L. Shaia, Allan B. Copperman, Eric Flisser, “Ovulation 
Induction/ART/IVF/ICSI,” in Rhoda Sperling, ed., Obstetrics and Gynecology (Wiley Online 
Library, 2020), Chapter 34, https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119450047.  
32 M.A. Gadalla, R. Wang, M. van Wely, B.W.J. Mol, “Editorial: How should we report 
outcomes in reproductive medicine?” Ultrasound in Obstetrics & Gynecology, Vol. 51 
(2018): 7-9, https://doi.org/10.1002/uog.18969, accessed 31 December 2020. 
33 Gadalla et al., 8. 
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cycles are being performed every year, resulting in over 500,000 deliveries annually.”34  
“Success rates” vary internationally according to available data: for Europe (2014), 30% IVF 
success rate in 508,433 cycles, with 83% singleton birth; for USA (2015), 24% IVF live 
birth/started cycle in 231,936 cycles, with 19% singleton live birth; for Latin America (2015), 
24% IVF in 75,121 cycles, with 19% singleton live birth; for Africa (2013), 28% IVF, in 
25,770 cycles, no data on births (due to low access to care); Global (2008-2010), 20% ART 
delivery rate/fresh aspiration of oocytes out of 4.5 million cycles, with 21% multiple delivery 
rate; Worldwide (2004-2013), 5-29% live birth rate/fresh ART cycle out of 7 million cycles, 
with 4-27% multiple delivery rates.35  The latter data show that IVF and implantation can 
lead to “multiple gestation” that is itself a problematic consequence of the ART;36 and, 
indeed, it is reported that when multiple embryos are transferred at the same time the result 
has been “unacceptably high multiple pregnancy rates with major implications for perinatal 
morbidity and mortality.”37 
In view of the above scientific reports, we can consider that, from the view of physis, 
the ovum as oocyte to be fertilized is a natural possibility of human reproduction; but 
considered from the view of techné, it is viewed as a technical possibility of production.  The 
former remains intracorporeal in its naturally “functional” relations; the latter is 
extracorporeal in its technically “positioned” relations.  In the natural process the ovum 
emerges into presence qua ovulation or it remains in absence (anovulation).  It stands on its 
own within that process of physis.  But, this is not so in the case of extracorporeal 
																																																								
34 “Editorial: Towards the global coverage of a unified registry of IVF outcomes,” RMBO, 
Vol. 38, No. 2 (2019): 133-137.  
35 “Editorial: Towards the global coverage of a unified registry of IVF outcomes,” 133. 
36 See T. El-Toukhy, S. Bhattacharya, V.A. Akande, “Multiple Pregnancies Following 
Assisted Conception,” Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Scientific Impact 
Paper No. 22 (2018): DOI: 10.1111/1471-0528.14974, accessed 13 December 2020. 
37 “Editorial: Towards the global coverage of a unified registry of IVF outcomes,” 135.  The 
editors refer to B.C. Fauser, P. Devroey, N.S. Macklon, “Multiple birth resulting from 
ovarian stimulation for subfertility treatment,” The Lancet, No. 365  (2006): 1807-1816. 
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manipulation, i.e., production (die Herrgestelltheit).  All the techniques of ART are designed 
to “challenge” the woman’s body (Körper) to produce artificially what is then to be 
positioned and manipulated by the reproductive endocrinologist, the embryologist, and even 
the genetic bioengineer. 
Following Heidegger’s manner of thinking, we might say that the ovum freely enters 
its own when present in its naturally functional relations.  Consider the words here—freely 
(freilich) enters its own (in sein Eigenes eingehen).  But, does it enter its own when produced 
by techné, by the techniques of ART?  Contrast here is, on the one hand, a “bringing forth of 
oneself” (Sichhervorbringen) and, on the other, a “being produced” (ein Herrgestelltwerden).  
In both cases we have an unconcealment (Unverborgenheit).  But, the mode of presencing 
(Anwesenden), coming into being, in each is different.  The modes of presencing bring into 
view two different states of affairs.  In both cases we can and do have scientific explanation, 
one describing a natural phenomenon and functional process, the other explanation 
accompanied by a methodological commitment to technical production.  Why does this 
distinction matter?  Consider what Heidegger finds “uncanny” (unheimlich): 
The explosion of the atomic bomb is only the crudest of all crude confirmations of an 
annihilation of things that occurred long ago; confirmation that the thing as thing 
remains nullified.  The annihilation is so uncanny because it brings with it a twofold 
delusion.  For one, the opinion that science, more so than all other experience, would 
encounter the actual in its actuality [das Wirkliche in seiner Wirklichkeit].  Second, 
the pretense that the thing could just as well be a thing regardless of scientific 
research into the actual, which presupposes that there ever were essencing things at 
all.  If the things had ever shown themselves as things, then the thinghood of the thing 
would have been evident.  It would have laid claim to thinking.  In truth, however, the 
thing remains obstructed as thing, nullified and in this sense annihilated.  This 
occurred and occurs so essentially that the things are not only no longer admitted as 
things, but the things have not yet even been able to appear as things at all.38 
 
Thus, we accept that biological science, molecular biology, endocrinology, human 
genetics, etc., inform us (following Heidegger’s train of thought here) as to the “actuality,” 
																																																								
38 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 8-9. 
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the “reality” (die Wirklichkeit), of the ovum qua oocyte.  It “appears” to the scientist as an 
object represented as “what it is” according to the research methods in use, including thereby 
the assorted technologies through which it is manipulated and positioned in scientifically-
ordered relations.  Viewed un-scientifically, i.e., according to physis and not techné, the 
ovum stands in the natural functional relations of the human reproductive process, having its 
cycle of emergence during normal ovulation for the possibility of its fertilization; but, in the 
absence of that fertilization, the normal menstruation cleans the womb for the next cycle that 
repeats the process.  Here the ovum is understood to be not merely an oocyte in its cellular 
actuality, but a cell in all its potentiality in the woman’s perception of her body qua “lived 
body” (Leib) and not merely as physical body (Körper).  The woman’s perception is 
temporally delimited, i.e., attentive to the future and not merely to the present, thus to the 
possibility of an emergent human life as the ovum makes its way towards its possible 
fertilization. 
The lived-world (Lebenswelt) of the woman as prospective mother is the referential 
context of signification for the meaning attributed to the ovum other than as mere oocyte in 
the sense objectified by scientific investigation.  Thus does the woman as mother, as wife, 
receive the ovum not as an oocyte but as a gift (das Geschenk), as is said, e.g., in the context 
of consecration, “gift of life,” the ovum thus from its origin (arché) a “giving gift” (das 
schenkende Geschenk). Hence, one may say, in its essential provenance the ovum is never 
merely an oocyte and rather is it a giving gift, a giving of possibility, a potentiality of human 
life in the singular existence that is its essence as ovum.  And, where there is giving in this 
sense, there is gratitude, the prospective parents thus renewed in their caring (Heidegger’s 
sense of Sorge), in their solicitude (Heidegger’s sense of Fürsorge), for the emerging life that 
in due course becomes the child of the ovum’s promise that is present in the moment of its 
essential provenance. 
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In the foregoing one finds two contrasting representations of the being of the ovum: 
(1) one scientific such as one finds in the investigation of the ovum as oocyte by the 
biologist, who can even tell us wondrously the “measure” of the human ovum to be 150 
micrometers (150 x 10-6) and thus inform the reproductive endocrinologist, embryologist, and 
genetic bioengineer for purposes of their micro-technical manipulation; (2) the other that of 
the woman in her lived world, with her relations of care and concern that link the present 
state of affairs to the potentialities of life she projects to make them her own in her lived-
world.  In each of these ways of understanding, world (Welt) is conceived and experienced 
differently, one as technological, thus as a technologically-ordered world (eine technologisch 
geordenete Welt) in Heidegger’s sense of externally challenged and ordered relations, i.e., 
positionality (Ge-stell); and one as lived world (Lebenswelt) in which things stand on their 
own in Heidegger’s sense of Insichstehen. 
As noted, in both views we have an experience of unconcealment.  But, clearly, the 
manner in which disclosure occurs is manifestly different.  When a woman as prospective 
mother experiences her monthly cycle of ovulation, she takes care to help a child come into 
being as a meaningful part of the woman’s lived world.  But, when a reproductive 
endocrinologist or embryologist engages the ovum as oocyte s/he as scientist-technician 
forces into existence technically what otherwise remains concealed in the natural condition of 
anovulation.  In the context of physis, the ovum stands on its own in its possible emergence; 
while, in the context of techné it is “present” in its “actuality” as “standing reserve” 
(Bestand).  In the former, we have an event of releasement (Gelassenheit) for the ovum to 
stand on its own; while, in the latter one has a challenging-forth (Herausfordern) that 
positions the ovum as oocyte into technically-ordered relations.  Thus, Heidegger comments, 
where there are technically-ordered relations, “So placed, everything is: in consequence of 
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…”39 That is, a whole assortment of consequential procedures and events follows. The 
positioning of something in technically-ordered relations produces yet further consequences 
with a view to “results,” positioning in this way a “requisitioning” (das Be-Stellen) such that 
“an inventory arises” (der Bestand sicht).  And, in that way, there appears a standing-reserve 
that is then “imposed upon” (gestellt), “conscripted” (bestellt): “It is ordered, forced into 
conscription” (Es ist be-stellt, betroffen mit Gestellung).40 
Hence, said specifically in view of this consequentiality: A technique of ART 
challenges-forth into existence, conscripts the oocytes, the techniques of induced ovulation 
producing an inventory of oocytes, one or many subjected to consequent techniques of oocyte 
retrieval, genetic screening, germ-line engineering, IVF, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, 
implantation, perhaps multiple gestation, onward to live birth or miscarriage (spontaneous 
abortion);41 or, where implantation does not occur, the embryo is re-positioned even to the 
point of being cryopreserved (frozen) for later use and then eventually even “abandoned,” 
with fertility clinics unsure as to its ontological status (a “thing”, thus “property” in the view 
of civil law; a “juridical” person if not a “natural” person; in a “unique category of being,” 
thus something “interim”), 42  unsure as to “kinship” 43  or “ownership,” and fearful of 
																																																								
39 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “Positionality,” 25. 
40 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “Positionality,” 26 & 27. 
41 Aznar and Tudela, “Bioethics of Assisted Reproductive Technology,” report on the 
“efficacy” of ART, based on “data published by the European Society of Human 
Reproduction and Embryology” in 2014, the pregnancy rate following IVF in Europe 
between 1997 and 2010 varying “between 22.28 and 29.2%...with a mean rate of 26.41%,” 
and the live birth rate per ovarian stimulation cycle “between 13.07 and 22.4%...with a mean 
rate of 18.81%.”  With IVF methods, “more than 200,000 children are now born annually 
worldwide…i.e., more than 3% of all children born, with the total number of births estimated 
at over 5 million.” 
42 Hannah C. Catchings, “A ‘Modern Family’ Issue: Recategorizing Embryos in the 21st 
Century,” Louisiana Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (2020): 
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol80/iss4/12, accessed 29 December 2020.  
Catching observes (p. 1525): “The Louisiana Civil Code categorizes all persons as either 
natural persons or juridical persons.  Currently, the Louisiana Legislature classifies pre-
implantation embryos as juridical persons.” She proposes: “The Louisiana Legislature should 
amend the legal status of pre-implantation embryos to be a ‘unique category of being,’ rather 
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“disposing” a “potential life” in view of “wrongful death” litigation unless “ethically” 
disposed to do so.44  All such techniques and positionings are “at the ready” not merely 
sequentially but consequentially according to the conscription. 
Heidegger’s discussion of positionality clarifies that what is underway as the reign of 
global technology is not to be causally attributed to some merely human machination 
(Machenschaft).  Thus, Heidegger comments: “The question remains in what way is the 
human already drawn into the essence of requisitioning [das Wesen des Bestellens].  What 
(however) does this mean here: ‘the human’ (‘der Mensch’)?  ‘The human’ exists [existiert] 
nowhere.”45  Thus, Heidegger continues: 
																																																																																																																																																																												
than juridical persons or mere property…” This “unique category” may be framed as an 
entity “that is entitled to special respect because of its potential for human life,” thus “a 
thing” if not a “person.”  The embryos status would change over time—“Prior to in vitro 
fertilization…closer to…things,” and “After fertilization and successful implantation into a 
woman’s uterus, an embryo may shift closer to the classification of persons.”  
43 Heather Jacobson, “Do Embryos have Kinship? Negotiating Meanings of Relatedness in 
the Fertility Clinic,” Adoption & Culture, Vol. 7, No. 9 (2019): 230-243, 
https://doi.org/10.26818/adoptionculture.7.2.0230, accessed 29 December 2020.  Jacobson 
reports: “Since 1984 when the first live birth from a previously frozen embryo occurred, 
cryopreservation of embryos has become increasingly common…Roughly thirty-eight 
percent of the 263,579 assisted reproductive technology (ART) cycles completed in the US in 
2016…involved previously frozen embryos.”  
44 See here Mary Pflum, “Nation’s fertility clinics struggle with a growing number of 
abandoned embryos,” NBC News, 12 August 2019, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/features/nation-s-fertility-clinics-struggle-growing-number-
abandoned-embryos-n1040806, accessed 29 December 2020.  See also, Jeffrey Krasner, 
“Technology, legal gaps leave embryos in limbo,” 
http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2005/05/18/technology_legal_gaps_leave_embr
yos_in_limbo?pg=full, accessed 29 December 2020; American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, “Disposition of abandoned embryos: a committee opinion,” Fertility and Sterility, 
Vol. 99, No. 7 (2013): https://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282(13)00281-1/pdf, 
accessed 29 December 2020; “Destroying abandoned embryos ‘ethically acceptable’ for IVF 
clinics: US doctors,” National Post, 10 September 2013, 
https://nationalpost.com/health/destroying-abandoned-embryos-ethically-acceptable-for-ivf-
clinics-u-s-doctors, accessed 29 December 2020.  In the latter article, it is reported that “an 
estimated five million children have been born worldwide using in vitro fertilization, and the 
number of ‘excess’ embryos left over after IVF continues to grow…There are an estimated 
400,000 frozen embryos in the U.S.  Of those, fewer than five per cent [n<20,000] are 
considered abandoned…”  
45 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “Positionality,” 29. 
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…the humans are only capable of this insofar as they themselves are already ordered 
into this requisitioning.  Humans, in their relation to what presences, are already 
challenged in advance, and therefore everywhere, and thus constantly, to represent 
what presences as something orderable for a requisitioning.  Insofar as human 
representation [das menschliche Vorstellen] has already posited [gestellt] what 
presences as something orderable in the calculation [die Rechnung] of a 
requisitioning, the human remains, according to his essence [nach seinem Wesen] and 
whether knowingly or not, ordered into a requisitioning for the requisitioning of the 
orderable. 
 The human himself ‘stands now within such a conscription [Der Mensch 
selbst steht jetzt in solcher Gestellung].46 
 
With these words Heidegger expresses his insight into what is uncanny in the way technology 
dominates and appropriates humans into the service of conscription.  The dynamic of 
technology is global, planetary-wide, not isolated to the here and there of human activity, 
even penetrating to the level of micro- and nano- measures of research investigation and 
positioning and re-positioning of molecular-level life structures (as “calculable material”) and 
processes.  Hence, Heidegger opines, “Requisitioning assaults at the same time the destiny of 
the human [das Geschick des Menschen].  The essence of the human [das Wesen des 
Menschen] is imposed upon to collaborate in carrying out the requisitioning in a human 
manner.”47 
 We can see thus how the human being in his or her physical body (Körper) especially 
is positioned within thoroughly technical relations, the body in its totality and in its 
anatomical-physiological-kinesiological “parts.”  However, a further distinction is in order, 
according to Heidegger’s insight.  The oocyte, we should say, becomes thereby a “piece” 
(das Stück) of the standing-reserve and in that sense “other than” a part (der Teil).  What is 
the difference between a piece and a part?  Heidegger clarifies: 
The part shares itself with parts in a whole.  It takes part in the whole, belongs to it.  
The piece on the contrary is separated and indeed, as the piece, is even isolated from 
the other pieces.  It never shares itself with these in a whole.  The piece of standing 
reserve does not even share itself with its own kind in the standing reserve.48 
																																																								
46 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “Positionality,” 29; GA79, 30. 
47 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “Positionality,” 32-33; GA79, 34. 
48 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “Positionality,” 34. 
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Heidegger observes further that, when something is engaged as a piece in an inventory along 
with other pieces, 
The pieces of the standing reserve are piece-for-piece equivalent [die Gleichen].  
Their character as pieces demands this uniformity [Gleichförmige]…The uniformity 
of the pieces provides that one piece can be exchanged for the other without further 
ado, i.e., is in place for this, and thus stands at the ready.  One piece of standing 
reserve is replaceable by another.  The piece as piece is already imposed upon for 
replaceability [Ersetzbarkeit].”49 
 
Precisely this manner of equivalence and replaceability is imposed upon each oocyte that is 
retrieved and positioned in an inventory “at the ready” for the assorted consequential 
techniques of IVF, and even more so in the case of the novel methods of advanced 
reproductive technology that more forcibly “challenge-forth” the retrieval of oocytes via “in 
vitro maturation (IVM),” thus to disclose the intensified calculative thinking in use.50 
 Thus, when Heidegger asserts that, “The human is exchangeable within the 
requisitioning of the standing reserve,” we can now understand that this follows in present 
context from a biological reductionism that focuses on the human in her “presence” 
(Anwesenheit) qua physical body that is then challenged-forth in its entirety, all the way 
																																																								
49 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “Positionality,” 35. 
50 B.I. Rose, “Approaches to oocyte retrieval for advanced reproductive technology cycles 
planning to utilize in vitro maturation: a review of the many choices to be made,” Journal of 
Assisted Reproductive Genetics, Vol. 31 (2014): 1409-1419, DOI: 10.1007.s10815-014-0334-
9, accessed 14 December 2020.  It is worthwhile citing Rose’s pertinent remarks (pp. 1409-
1410) to highlight the procedure of IVM: 
In conventional IVF, patients are treated with exogenous gonadotropins with the 
objective of obtaining a cohort of oocytes that are mature (have extruded polar 
bodies) at the time of oocyte retrieval.  The decision to induce maturity (usually with 
an hCG injection) is made when an adequate number of follicles have diameters 
greater than 17 or 18 mm.  Oocyte retrieval is undertaken about 36 h later and the 
largest diameter follicle is usually at least 20 mm in diameter.  Oocytes are fertilized 
and the best embryos are transferred into the uterus. 
 In an advanced reproductive technology cycle in which in vitro maturation 
will be used (IVM), oocytes are removed from much smaller follicles and most 
oocytes will still be immature (germinal vesicle intact).  The decision to proceed to 
oocyte retrieval will be made when the largest follicle is less than 10 mm, 12 mm, or 
14 mm, depending on the philosophy of the program…With IVM, oocytes in 
prophase I are cultured until they become metaphase II.  They are then fertilized and 
the best embryos are transferred into the uterus as with conventional IVF. 
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down to its cellular presence.  The molecular biology of ART, IVF, IVM, etc., “decides”, 
then “determines,” each possibility of human life in a “programmatic” philosophy that 
chooses “the best embryos”51 for uterine implantation and clinical pregnancy, while other 
oocytes and embryos are “discarded”—after all, each is exchangeable with another as a piece 
in the inventory of retrieved oocytes and then in the inventory of embryos, all “equivalent” 
and “replaceable” despite each having its ownmost possibility of personal identity from the 
moment of conception.  In fact, any thought of personal identity, of “singular existence,” is 
absent when oocytes and embryos are conceived to be equivalent, exchangeable, pieces of 
inventory, one and all severally and jointly “at the ready” qua standing reserve for a 
disposition controlled by all involved in the laboratory and clinical techniques in use. 
 What is uncanny here for us (and one assumes would be so for Heidegger) is that, 
despite human involvement in all such technological activity, and “because the human does 
not decide about his essence [Wesen] on his own terms, and never by himself, for this reason 
the requisitioning of the standing reserve, for this reason positionality, the essence of 
technology [das Ge-Stell, das Wesen der Technik] cannot be anything merely human.”52  
What, then, one may ask, is one to do?  Heidegger answers: In contrast to asking and seeking 
to answer “the question that is always closest and solely urgent—what are we to do?—we 
first and only consider this: How must we think, for thinking is the authentic action 
[Handeln]…”53 
																																																								
51 The use of the term ‘best embryos’ often includes a perspective of “selective reduction.”  
In clinical guidance provided by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
“Multifetal pregnancy reduction is defined as a first-trimester or early second-trimester 
procedure for reducing the total number of fetuses in a multifetal pregnancy by one or more.”  
See here American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, “Committee Opinion: 
Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction,” Number 719, (2017): 
https://www.acog.org/clinical/clinical-guidance/committee-
opinion/articles/2017/09/multifetal-pregnancy-reduction, accessed 05 January 2020. 
52 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “Positionality,” 37 & 39, GA79, 39. 
53 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “The Turn,” 66-67. 
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  To engage this question—How must we think?—is to take the step back from 
calculative thinking into a reflection on where we “stand” today or, better said, what has 
“befallen” us as we continue the press of technologies according to some misplaced 
assumption of the beneficence of technological fixes.  We should recall, accordingly, that the 
first IVF baby girl was born in July 1978, the first IVF baby boy born in January 1979, that 
the techniques in use for IVF have changed considerably from the initial methods of 
laparotomy and laparoscopic techniques having less than 50% success rate, then to 
transvaginal oocyte retrieval technique first reported in 1984, and onward to current 
techniques of IVM—the consequence of which is that “millions of successful IVF births” 
have ensued,54 even as fertility clinics now face the ethical, legal, and social quandary of 
what to do with an unknown number of abandoned cryopreserved human embryos. 
 Thinking reflectively, we should thus consider that once a woman’s ovum is displaced 
from its singular existence and objectified merely as oocyte in an inventory of equivalent and 
replaceable pieces, then the ovum effectively loses its “guard,” its “maternal protection”—as 
Heidegger would say: “Positionality in its positioning lets the thing go without protection—
without the guard of its essence as a thing.”55  Thus, from the inception of its life in 
technologically-induced conception through the scientific-biotechnological methods of 
transvaginal oocyte retrieval to the beginning of its life in a live birth, the human child is 
positioned by technology such that its essence is altered thereby, manifesting the dominance 
of techné over physis.  Through positionality the ovum is positioned into a thoroughly 
objectified presence in which its “unguarding” (Verwahrlosung), its loss of guard, loss of 
maternal protection, takes place. 
																																																								
54 See Pankaj Srivastava, “Transvaginal Oocyte Retrieval in IVF: Should we really be scared 
of the procedure?” Gynecology and Reproductive Endocrinology, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2018): 15-
17, DOI: 10.35841/2591-7994.2.1.16-18, accessed 30 December 2020. 
55 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “The Danger,” 44-45. 
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 The task is first to think in a way such that “guardianship” (Wahrnis) is restored, in 
and for a thinking that enables the deed through which such human life is once again 
guarded, i.e., receives “the mother’s protection.”  This requires, as Heidegger says, the step 
back from calculative thinking to a meditative thinking that is commemorative thinking.  This 
latter thinking recalls the essential difference of physis and techné, discerns the semblance of 
normality that is present in calculative thinking qua technicity, and discerns thereby the loss 
of guardianship that is unconcealed in the manner in which molecular biology and 
biotechnology “impose upon” and “position” the human ovum, the human spermatozoon, and 
the human embryo as pieces of inventory.  It is in such a way that, as Heidegger remarks, 
“positionality dissembles its essential danger,”56 a dissembling that we do not discern as we 
are steeped in assumptions about scientific-technological progress and the supposed 
beneficence of technological fixes promised by “advances” in biotechnology. 
 Heidegger anticipates a possible “conversion” from the dominance of technology, i.e., 
from positionality, through thinking differently.  If the human essence is genuinely to 
correspond to the essence of technology as positionality, then it is necessary that there be a 
shift in comportment from one in which humans think themselves to be masters of 
technology to one in which humans are guardians of technology and, thereby, guardians of 
the human essence.  The fact is that “all mere willing and doing in the manner of 
requisitioning only perpetuates the unguarding”57 that we encounter daily in technology as 
positionality.  To expose ourselves to the essence of technology is to open ourselves to a 
conversion in thought and thereby to a conversion in action.  Thus, in anticipation of the step 
back into a reflection, Heidegger calls upon us to take heed of a salient fact: “in our age 
everywhere upon the earth a uniform manner of thinking achieves world-historical 
dominance.”  Indeed, “this uniform thinking is only the form leveled down and rendered 
																																																								
56 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “The Danger,” 52. 
57 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “The Turn,” 72. 
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useful, of that historical formation of thought that we name Western-European…” 58  
Notwithstanding, Heidegger contends, even though one speaks of the thinking that is 
“restricted to the historicality of Western-European history,” even so “as restricted to this, it 
is at the same time unleashed as the fundamental characteristic of the modern world 
technology of our planetary age.”59  No society, culture, nation today escapes the calculative 
thinking and the positionality of technology. 
Yet, it will not do to conceive the whole of the technological world as something 
made by humans, Heidegger says.  Rather, insofar as humans are drawn after technology, we 
are to take notice that the whole of the human way to be “finds itself everywhere challenged 
to take up the planning and calculating of everything.”60  All beings, all things, and first of all 
the human being, are challenged-forth into a position of standing-reserve for planning and 
calculating undertaken through the instrumentality of the human being who thinks himself 
the master of technology.  Essential, meditative, commemorative thinking tells us otherwise.  
To pit meditative thinking against calculative thinking is to make the shift towards 
guardianship of human life, even the very essence of the human being, from the moment of 
its inception in the ovum and the embryo that ever requires its most proper guardianship in 
the protection rendered by the woman as mother, 61 and who consecrates that life as a giving 
																																																								
58 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “Basic Principles of Thinking,” 89-90. 
59 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “Basic Principles of Thinking,” 93. 
60 Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, “Basic Principles of Thinking,” 115 & 116. 
61 See here Gerda Neyer and Laura Bernardi, “Feminist Perspectives on Motherhood and 
Reproduction,” Stockholm University Linnaeus Center on Social Policy and Family 
Dynamics in Europe, SPaDE, Working Paper 2011: 4, 
https://www.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.18714.1320939635!/WP_2011_4.pdf, accessed 05 January 
2021.  The authors opine: “Feminist discourse shows how ART has further decomposed 
biological motherhood and has altered the meaning of motherhood and reproduction.  
Feminist analysis maintains that despite the rhetoric of choice surrounding ART, these 
technologies have not increased women’s reproductive freedom.  The decomposition of 
biological motherhood, the medical, legal, and commercial development of reproduction, and 
the change in the social perception of motherhood have rather established new forms of 
control over female reproduction.”  The “decomposition” here includes a plurivocal sense of 
‘mother’, thus: “‘ovarian mothers’ (those who provide the eggs), ‘uterine mothers’ (those 
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gift, the woman thus having genuine reproductive choice and a genuinely free relationship to 
the extant technologies that seek to govern reproductive freedom.  
																																																																																																																																																																												
who carry out the pregnancy and give birth), and ‘social mothers’ (those who raise the 
child).”  Furthermore, the authors argue (pp. 14 & 15) a new comportment arises, according 
to which “medical and technical assistance” to the would-be mother not only seeks to 
overcome nature’s “deficiency” but actually “legitimize[s] ART” and “‘naturalizes’ it,” such 
that, “The importance of this shift in the perception of nature lies precisely in that its depicts 
women and their reproductive functions as inferior to technology and subjects them to it.” 
